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Thanks to Prof. Halberstam for trying to shift the debate away from the critique of the
Opinion 2/13 to a more constructive discussion on the way forward and trying to present
the Opinion from a different, resolutely constitutional, perspective.
Prof. Halberstam’s assessment of the Opinion 2/13 is based on the premise that the EU’s
constitutional order is, as he put it, a “deep federal-type structure”. This federalist
approach to Opinion 2/13 (and the autonomy of EU law) appears to be influenced by US
constitutional experience and thinking. It neglects some important features of Europe’s
multi-layered human rights protection system as well as the EU’s own constitutional
order. Unlike the USA, the EU is not (yet) a federal state. It is composed of sovereign
nations which have transferred only some of their competences to supranational
institutions. The EU Treaty itself imposes the duty to respect the national identities of
Member States inherent in their constitutional and political structures (Article 4(2) TEU).
Respect for pluralism is crucial when it comes to fundamental rights protection.
In opinion 2/13, the CJEU appears to be more concerned about primacy than about
pluralism or substantive rights. It applies the principle of absolute primacy of EU law to
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, not only in relation to ECHR rights but also to
those guaranteed under national constitutions. It is, however, doubtful that Member
States ever intended to give such a far-reaching meaning to the EU Charter. As Prof.
Kirchhof recently demonstrated, Article 51 (1) of the EU Charter merely makes the
Charter rights applicable, it does not contain a rule about which rights should have
precedence over the others ("Kollisionsregel") in situations where Charter rights and
rights guaranteed under national constitutions apply in parallel.  It is quite striking that
truly federal states like Austria, Germany or the USA allow that constituent entities
guarantee higher or different fundamental rights standards, without that being
considered as a threat to the primacy, unity or effectiveness of the respective federal
law.
The aim and purpose of fundamental rights is not to foster harmonisation or uniformity;
they are about the empowerment of individuals and the protection of liberty primarily
against state authorities. Uniformity is neither required nor desirable in a Europe
composed of sovereign nations, each of which with its own distinctive traditions of
fundamental rights protection. What is required is consensus on certain minimum
standards. Member States have agreed on those minimum standards back in 1950 when
they adopted the ECHR which constitutes a common “shared view” of European human
rights law, defining “the margin within which states may opt for different fundamental
balances between government and individuals.”  By the way, the claim of
constitutionalisation is not unique to the realm of EU law. The ECtHR has repeatedly
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characterised the ECHR "as a constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre
public)". Several authors have also suggested that the ECtHR is – or should become –
more like a constitutional court. It is significant that none of the 47 Member States of the
Council of Europe opposed the autonomy of its legal order when it accepted the
independent external scrutiny of the ECtHR and, as a consequence, the obligation to
abide by its judgments even if this requires reviewing the case law of supreme and/or
constitutional courts in individual cases or the modification of legislative or constitutional
provisions.
We agree with Prof. Halberstam’s questioning of the CJEU’s use of the ‘high’ and ‘low’,
maximal and minimal nomenclature in the context of fundamental rights protection.
Such rights entail choices as to the appropriate balance between the interests of
individuals against those of other individuals or the community. Many rights require a
sometimes complex balancing exercise, between the rights of one individual and the
interests of other individuals, groups or the general public. A ‘race to the top’, seeking
ever higher standards makes little sense in cases of competing human-rights interests
which must be reconciled, such as freedom of expression versus privacy or the right to
property versus the right to strike.
In this comment, we can only deal with some of the CJEU’s objections, as presented by
Prof. Halberstam, namely those concerning the co-respondent mechanism and prior
involvement, mutual trust in JHA matters, Article 344 TFEU and Protocol 16. On CFSP, we
agree with Prof. Halberstam that it may be desirable to extend the CJEU’s limited
jurisdiction. However, requiring such extension, which will require amendments to the
EU Treaties, as a precondition for accession risks making accession practically impossible
for the foreseeable future.
As regards the co-respondent mechanism and prior involvement procedure, the
incompatibilities found by the CJEU are primarily technical and may be addressed by
amendments and/or additions to the DAA. The main point is whether additional
safeguards for the EU are really necessary and would be acceptable to non-EU Member
States. As Prof. Jacqué observed pertinently, "it takes two to tango". The co-respondent
mechanism was discussed at length during the negotiations. The provisions were drafted
in order to accommodate to fullest possible manner the autonomy of the EU legal order
as well as to ensure that the ECtHR does not pronounce itself on the issues of the EU law.
Going beyond what has been achieved during the negotiations risks sacrificing the role
and status of the ECtHR under the Convention. In any case, in the event of accession, the
tasks of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts would be fully complementary. The
prior-involvement mechanism was included at the request of the CJEU (and ECtHR). It
must be stressed that the 'prior-involvement' procedure would not apply in direct
actions against the EU, which are those that are comparable to procedures against other
Contracting Parties, but only in the probably rare cases in which the EU will be joined as a
co-respondent. In such rather rare cases, non-EU member states eventually accepted, as
part of a comprehensive package of compromise solutions, that the procedure is
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justified by the considerations of subsidiarity and the ‘specific characteristics of Union
law’, which required the introduction of the co-respondent procedure in the first place,
but only limited to questions of validity.
A major goal pursued by accession is to close existing gaps in judicial protection by giving
European citizens the same protection vis-a-vis acts of the Union as they presently enjoy
vis-a-vis all EU member states. In that context, the CJEU’s objection regarding JHA’s
matters appears problematic. The CJEU’s reasoning seems questionable even from a
purely EU law perspective. While the ‘values’ of the EU include human rights and the rule
of law, there is no mention of the primacy of EU law, of mutual trust in JHA matters, or of
preventing any international court from exercising jurisdiction over EU-related matters.
Under the EU treaties, mutual recognition is merely a ‘principle’ to be used to facilitate
judicial cooperation among EU member states. It should not be weighed against, or, even
worse, used to escape compliance with legal obligations to respect fundamental rights
under EU primary law. Respect for fundamental rights constitutes a key component of
the area of freedom, security and justice, as explicitly foreseen by Article 67 (1) TFEU. It is
noteworthy that the European Parliament and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency both
advocated the use of fundamental rights-based refusal grounds in EU legislation
providing for mutual recognition. More significantly, in a recent JHA legal instrument,
Directive 2014/41/EU on the European Investigation Order, non-compliance with
fundamental rights was explicitly provided for as a refusal ground.
EU member states are not immune from being found in violation of even the core
human rights such as Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment. A recent illustration of the different approaches of
the two European courts is the ECtHR’s Tarakhel judgment, whose individualised
assessment of the applicants’ situation contrasts with the CJEU’s defence of the Dublin
system in the Abdullahi judgment. These judgments show at the same time that even
without accession JHA issues are already before the ECtHR. The challenge to the
conception of mutual trust in JHA matters could hardly become more severe than it
already is. Rather on the contrary, accession and a strong co-respondent mechanism
provide the possibility for comprehensive external scrutiny of the JHA system as a whole,
with the active participation of protagonists from both the supranational and the
national levels, thereby enhancing both trust in the various mutual recognition systems
and human rights protection for the individuals concerned. Exempting JHA matters from
the scope of external control would be a curtailment of existing ECHR jurisdiction in one
of the core areas where effective fundamental rights protection is most important.
The CJEU’s objections regarding Article 344 TFEU and the exclusivity of the EU
adjudication of Member States disputes could probably be addressed by inserting a
provision in the DAA expressly excluding ECtHR’s jurisdiction for disputes between
member states, or between member states and the EU, regarding the application of the
ECHR in the context of the EU law. While being required by the CJEU, the question
remains why is it necessary to foresee something in an international treaty with Non-
Member States which concerns primarily relations between the EU and its Member
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States and which is anyway expressly prohibited by EU law? Paragraph 64 of the draft
explanatory report to the DAA explains that this issue was deliberately excluded from
the DAA because “…Article 344 […] states that EU member States 'undertake not to
submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any
method of settlement other than those provided for therein'.”
Protocol 16, which was adopted after the conclusion of the negotiations, is not part of
the accession package, nor has it even entered into force. If the intention were to restrict
the use of the advisory opinion procedure through an amendment to Protocol 16 and/or
its explanatory report, it would be a matter for the Council of Europe Member States
alone, the EU having neither participated in the drafting of Protocol 16 nor is it covered
by the DAA. On substance, the CJEU’s objections may be considered technical, requiring
simply clarifications in the DAA. However, the necessity of such clarifications remains
doubtful, as already demonstrated by Prof. Callewaert. National courts of EU Member
States are obliged to refer issues of EU law to the CJEU under the article 267 TFEU.
Therefore, it is unlikely that supreme courts would go 'forum shopping' to Strasbourg.
Moreover, non-binding advisory opinions under Protocol 16 cannot prevail over binding
EU law including the interpretations given by the CJEU in preliminary reference
proceedings. In the unlikely event that 'highest national courts' would request an
advisory opinion on points somehow linked to EU law, it must be taken into account that
the ECtHR has always been careful to respect the autonomy of EU law and to avoid any
legal determination capable of encroaching on it. As regards rights guaranteed under
both ECHR and EU Charter, by virtue of article 52 (3) of the EU Charter, EU law has itself
limited the scope of its autonomy, declaring that the "meaning and scope" of Charter
rights "shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR". Consequently, in this limited
area, EU law issues are also Convention issues and vice versa. Two scenarios may be
distinguished. First, in all cases where article 267 TFEU applies, there is no threat to EU
law autonomy, including on EU fundamental rights. On the other hand, in the rare
instances where this provision would not apply and the ECtHR would be asked to give an
advisory opinion nonetheless, such an opinion – if the ECtHR accepted to give it – would
by definition be confined to “questions of principle relating to the interpretation or
application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the protocols
thereto”. Thus, in keeping with the principle according to which the ECHR only defines
minimum standards (article 53 ECHR), such an opinion would be given without prejudice
to EU law going beyond the Convention protection level, a scenario explicitly foreseen in
the second sentence of article 52 (3) of the EU Charter (unless of course competing rights
in multipolar relationships would be disregarded, see above).
We remain convinced that EU accession to the ECHR will eventually put in place the
missing link in Europe’s system of fundamental rights protection. Only EU accession to
the ECHR can ultimately ensure effective protection for individuals, legal certainty and
coherence in fundamental rights protection all over Europe.[3]
This contribution was written in a strictly personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect
the official position of the Council of Europe.
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If you enjoyed reading this post – would you consider supporting our work? Just click
here. Thanks!
All the best, Max Steinbeis
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